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Introduction
A dramatic and virtually unprecedented shift in
the portfolio structure of U.S. commercial banks
has taken place since 1989. Specifically, govern-
ment securities as a share of total loans has risen
from 15 percent in 1989 to more than 22 percent
today. This portfolio shift has coincided with an
important change in the financial regulatory struc-
ture. Bank regulators around the world agreed to
a common set of risk-based capital requirements
in mid-1988. These requirements were phased in
gradually in the United States and became fully
effective this year.
Some have suggested a connection between
the regulatory changes and the portfolio shift,
although this claim has not been substantiated.
In this paper, we will present some rather strong
evidence that the portfolio shift is consistent
with regulatory change, which has increased
the attractiveness of government securities as
an asset.
1 The evidence comes from an exami-
nation of the quarterly "call report" data on
commercial banks from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
• 1 For some other interesting approaches to the same problem, see
Furlong (1992), Jacklin (1993), and Hancock and Wilcox (1992).
Though bankers and their regulators find
the portfolio shift interesting in itself, it also
has broader implications. Our results provide
evidence that regulation matters—a point of
considerable debate for capital requirements in
particular (Keeley [1988]) and for public poli-
cies in general (Stigler [1975])- The reason is
that bank portfolio risk strongly affects the
chance of financial collapse and an associated
government bailout. Concerns about this possi-
bility motivated the risk-based capital standards
in the first place. Furthermore, by altering the
credit available to businesses and consumers, a
shift in bank portfolios may slacken the pace
of economic recovery.
The new risk-based capital requirements
classify bank assets. Government securities are
deemed to be riskless and therefore have a
zero weight when the bank determines its re-
quired capital.
2 Thus, a bank that finds it diffi-
cult to meet its capital requirements can do so
by shifting its asset portfolio away from loans
and other high-risk-weighted assets toward
government securities.
• 2 U.S. government securities have a zero risk weight because there is
no default risk. However, they are subject to interest-rate risk, and the new
capital requirements have been criticized for ignoring this component.FIGURE 1
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Growth in Government Securities,
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There are, of course, other plausible reasons
why bank portfolios have shifted toward gov-
ernment securities. First, the large loan losses
of the 1980s made business lending appear
more risky and less attractive. Second, the busi-
ness slowdown that coincided with the intro-
duction of risk-based capital requirements
weakened loan demand. The decline in loan
demand was exceptionally large in the recent
recession because of the boom in business and
consumer leverage in the mid-1980s. Thus, the
shift toward government securities could also
be the result of these factors.
We submit that the changes in portfolio com-
position are strongly related to the introduction
of risk-based capital requirements. Specifically,
banks with the largest increases in government
securities holdings tend to be those with the low-
est capital-asset ratios when the new capital re-
quirements were introduced. The conclusion is
unaffected when we control for the weakness of
the bank's loan portfolio.
3 Thus, the change in





The composition of commercial bank portfolios
has changed dramatically over the years. For
the first two postwar decades, banks reduced
the proportion of their assets in securities and
increased the proportion in loans. Part of the
reason was the need to liquidate large holdings
of government securities accumulated during
World War II. Moreover, the development of
highly liquid and active money markets as
sources of funds reduced the precautionary
need to hold both government securities and
cash assets (see Boyd and Gertler [19931).
These secular shifts in banks' activities were
completed by the early 1980s.
Some dramatic changes have taken place
more recently, however. Figure 1 shows the
growth of total loans and total securities since
1973- After rapid gains beginning in 1973, the
outstanding stock of bank loans has been con-
stant for the last three years. Total securities hold-
ings expanded less rapidly through the 1980s
and began to speed up in the last three years.
• 3 It is more difficult to control for the influence of loan demand on
portfolio shifts because we lack any bank-specific measures of the strength
of demand. Still, while other factors may explain part of the portfolio shift,
they do not overturn the importance of the new capital requirements.FIGURE 3
Government Securities, C&i Loans,
and Real Estate Loans as a Share of
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More detail is provided in figure 2, which shows
three critical categories—government securities,
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, and real
estate loans. The rapid increase in government se-
curities holdings since the late 1980s has clearly co-
incided with a substantial decline in the volume of
C&I loans outstanding.
Finally, figure 3 presents the proportions of
these three critical categories in total loans and
securities. The share of C&I loans began to de-
cline around 1984. Real estate loans as a percent
of the total began to increase in 1986 and then
leveled off around 1990. Most important, the pro-
portion of U.S. government securities in total
loans and securities rose dramatically in the three
years following 1989. The bank portfolio shifts of
the last decade thus occurred in two stages:
Banks initially turned from C&I loans to real es-
tate loans, but then shifted from loans to U.S.
government securities in recent years.
II. Changes in
Bank Portfolios
Regulation mandating commercial-bank capital
requirements has evolved over the years. In
1985, regulators established a required ratio of
book value of equity (primary capital) to assets
of 5.5 percent. There was also a total capital re-
quirement of 6 percent for the ratio of primary
and secondary capital to assets. U.S. and for-
eign regulators agreed in 1988 to implement
risk-based capital requirements. The new re-
quirements were phased in gradually begin-
ning in 1990 and became fully effective at the
end of 1992 (see Saunders [19931).
U.S. commercial banks are now required to
have a minimum ratio of total (Tier 1 + Tier 2)
capital to risk-adjusted assets of 8 percent.
4 In
order to calculate risk-adjusted assets, each as-
set is assigned to one of four risk categories
and given a weight of 0, 20, 50, or 100 percent.
U.S. government securities are in the first cate-
gory, with a risk weight of zero. C&I loans and
most real estate loans (except securitized mort-
gage pools and regular residential mortgage
loans) are assigned a weight of 100 percent.
Risk-adjusted assets are thus simply a weighted
average of the bank's portfolio of assets. In ad-
dition, the entire portfolio faces a leverage re-
striction: Total capital must be 4 percent of
total assets (unweighted).
5
Thus, a commercial bank that moves its as-
set holdings from loans with a full 8 percent
capital requirement to government securities
with no capital requirement eases the associ-
ated regulatory burden. Clearly, banks that are
inadequately capitalized have an incentive to
increase the proportion of their assets in gov-
ernment securities. Our central hypothesis is
simply that the large changes in bank balance
sheets observed in the last three years repre-
sent a response to these incentives.
One alternative hypothesis is that the shift
into government securities was an effort to
avoid risk as bank asset portfolios weakened
in general. Because banks found it more diffi-
cult to manage their risky asset portfolios, they
viewed government securities more favorably,
and there was a flight to quality. This hypothe-
sis is credible in light of the documented dete-
rioration in the condition of commercial bank
portfolios in the 1980s.
• 4 The minimum ratio of Tier 1 capital (primarily common stock
equity) to risk-adjusted assets is 4 percent. Tier 2 capital includes certain
types of preferred stock and subordinated debt. The details of the new rules
are published in the Federal Register, January 27,1989, pp. 4186-221.
• 5 The Basel agreements themselves specify only Tier 1 risk-based
and total risk-based ratios. Outside the United States, banks face only
those capital requirements. U.S. banks have an additional constraint:
minimum leverage. While the capital guidelines implementing the Basel
Accord specified a constraint of 3 percent, the prompt corrective action
guidelines of the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) mandated a
constraint of 4 percent, except for banks with a regulatory CAMEL rating
of 1. For a discussion, see Huber (1991), chapter 15, or Carnell (1992).FIGURE 4
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This downtrend is illustrated in figure 4.
Nonperforming assets as a percent of total as-
sets and net charge-offs as a share of total
loans and leases both began to rise in the mid-
1980s. However, this portfolio deterioration
preceded the change in asset composition by
several years. The shift of assets into govern-
ment securities started in the late 1980s when
banks' condition began to recover. The increas-
ing net charge-off rate and nonperforming loan
rates in 1990 and 1991 stemmed not from an
upturn in bad loans, but rather from a decline
in total loans outstanding.
As a final check, we control for the effects of
loan quality in section V. Though we cannot rule
out this factor, our results do indicate a risk-based
capital effect independent of loan quality.
An alternative explanation is that the change
in bank portfolios was related to loan demand
and overall economic conditions. Indeed, cycli-
cal changes in bank portfolio preferences are
quite common. For example, when monetary
policy eased in the mid-1970s and again at the
end of the 1980-82 recessions, the government
securities proportion of total loans and securi-
ties headed upward. The episode in the early
and mid-1980s is similar to the current situation.
Although monetary policy eased, banks were
reluctant to boost lending, and the proportion
of government securities in their portfolios in-
creased. At that time, the debt crisis in less-
developed countries influenced bank behavior.
In both of the earlier cases, however, a grow-
ing economy generated loan demand and the
run-up in government securities holdings
lasted only about two years.
In the recent episode, the rise in government
securities holdings has continued for almost
four years without any sign of abatement, plac-
ing the proportion of these securities in com-
mercial bank portfolios at unprecedented
levels. This situation may be unique because
the recovery that began two years ago has
been particularly sluggish. Despite an expan-
sionary monetary policy, the persistently weak
economy has held down loan demand, and as
a result, banks continue to augment their hold-
ings of government securities. Although it is dif-
ficult to distinguish between the effects of weak
loan demand or risk-based capital requirements
on bank holdings of government securities,' a
cyclical response to demand is unlikely to be
entirely responsible for the enormous portfolio
shifts observed.
A third alternative is that government securi-
ties became more profitable in the late 1980s.
The combination of a steep yield curve and a
large supply of government securities, driving
prices down, may have made banks eager cus-
tomers. This term-structure argument requires
more justification than is usually given: Many
bank loans are long term, and thus could also
be profitable for banks.
The story appears to rest on some shift not
in the term structure, but in the risk structure,
between Treasury bonds and bank loans. This
is less obvious than the initial statement, how-
ever. Perhaps the explosion in government
debt drove down the price of Treasuries (though
this point itself is controversial). In either case,
such general factors should not affect individ-
ual banks differently. Therefore, our strategy of
comparing well-capitalized and weakly capital-
ized banks is not sensitive to this shift. The
lower prices for Treasuries may explain the




Our hypothesis indicates that a bank's incentive
to satisfy the newly introduced risk-based capi-
tal requirements by adjusting its portfolio is
larger if the institution initially fails those new
requirements. That is, banks that will be capi-
tal constrained under the new standard if theyTABLE 1
Asset Allocations for Commercial
Banks by Size Class, March 1990
(percent)
Proportion of

































































SOURCES: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Quarterly
Reports on Income and Condition; and authors' calculations.
TABLE 2
Capital Ratios by Size Class,
March 1990-September 1992
(percent)
do nothing will thus take greater actions to
comply. In this section, we present the data
used to examine the relationship between the
initial risk-based capital ratio of individual
banks (in either 1988 or 1990) and the banks'
portfolio changes. Our data source is the
quarterly call reports on all U.S. commercial
banks. In addition, we show that a bank's in-
centive to hold government securities increases
even if it was not initially capital constrained.
Although the risk-based capital requirements
were announced in July 1988 and began to be
implemented in March 1989, the call reports
were not revised to reflect the new definitions
until March 1990. Prior to 1990, however, it is
possible to approximate the risk-based capital
ratio of the bank from the available data. In
both instances, we use algorithms developed
at the Federal Reserve Board by Avery and Ber-
ger (1991) to derive the risk-adjusted assets of
the bank. Thus, we will be able to look at the
changes in bank portfolios over two periods:
from June 1988 (when the new capital require-
ments were announced) to September 1992,
and from March 1990 (when the phase-in of
the new capital requirements began) to Sep-
tember 1992.
Our data set consists of 12,187 commercial





A. Capital Ratios and Changes
Total capital/
risk-adjusted assets, 18.38 16.41 13.95 11.44 10.82 8.67
March 1990
Change, 1990-92 0.12 1.14 1.27 1.41 1.45 2.71
Tier I capital/
risk-adjusted assets, 17.20 15.27 12.77 10.04 9.38 6.79
March 1990
Change, 1990-92 0.12 1.09 1.21 1.37 1.28 2.37





































SOURCES: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Quarterly
Reports on Income and Condition; and authors' calculations.
1. Less than $50 million 6,558
2. $50-100 million 2,685
3. $100-500 million 2,350
4. $500 million-1 billion 229
5. $1-5 billion 260
6. More than $5 billion 105
Table 1 shows that commercial bank asset
allocations differ according to bank size. For
example, the smallest banks had only 9 per-
cent of their assets in C&I loans, while the pro-
portion for the largest banks was 21 percent.
However, the asset allocation changes that oc-
curred over the two-and-a-half-year period be-
ginning in March 1990 were common to all
sizes of banks (the very smallest were some-
times an exception). Holdings of securities, par-
ticularly Treasury securities, rose and loans
(except for real estate loans) decreased.
The top part of table 2 shows the ratios of
capital to risk-adjusted assets at the start of the
period and the change for banks in each size
class over the sample period. On average,
• 6 Banks were removed from the sample if the data seemed to be
erroneous, if extreme outliers were present, or if the banks had greater
than 50 percent capital.TABLE 3
Bank Adjustment to Risk-Based Capital






















































































































SOURCES: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Quarterly Re-
ports on Income and Condition; and authors' calculations.
banks of all sizes were sufficiently well capital-
ized; the minimum total capital requirements
were 8 percent. Finally, in every size class,
banks augmented capital in this period.
To explore the relationship between portfo-
lio changes and capital requirements, we classi-
fied banks by total capital to risk-adjusted asset
groups at the start of the period. The capital re-
quirement classes and the distribution of banks
by size class are shown in the bottom part of ta-
ble 2. Most smaller banks had very high capital-
asset ratios, although there were a significant
number of exceptions. As bank size increases, the
proportion of banks with capital ratios under 8
percent rises as well. When we reach the largest
size class, very few banks exceeded the minimum
capital requirement by a comfortable margin.
Under this classification scheme, banks that
are severely undercapitalized (0 to 4 percent
capital ratio) or moderately undercapitalized (4
to 8 percent capital ratio) must meet the new
requirements to stay in business. They may
downsize, raise new capital, or rebalance their
portfolios to take advantage of the different
risk weights. The explicitly undercapitalized
banks are hot the only ones facing incentives
to increase their capital, however. Regulators
require banks to hold capital well in excess of
the minimum requirements in order to expand
or to be able to acquire new entities or busi-
nesses.
7 A bank that just satisfies the 8 percent
minimum capital ratio and wishes to sell mu-
tual funds, for example, would probably need
to increase its capital ratio before obtaining
regulatory permission.
To assess how banks responded to the new
capital requirements, we explore the nature of
capital. Capital satisfies the following identity:
(1) Capital = (capital/risk-weighted assets) X
(risk-weighted assets/total assets) X total
assets.
In other words, C= Rx Px TA, where C =
capital, R = the risk-weighted capital ratio, P =
the portfolio factor, and TA = total assets.
Using the standard circumflex notation for S , A AC,
proportionate changes (C = —pr), we get
A A A A C
C =R +P +TA, or
(2)
Because the risk-adjusted capital requirements
are a constraint on R, we see that equation (2)
descriptively allocates the adjustment of banks
to three possible courses of action: raise capi-
tal (increase C), adjust the portfolio (lower />),
or shrink total assets (lower TA ). Table 3 re-
ports this breakdown.
Three patterns stand out in table 3- Banks did
shift their portfolios in a way that reduced their
capital requirements. Furthermore, this shift was
more pronounced for undercapitalized banks at
every size level. Banks likewise responded by
raising capital, although the well-capitalized
banks apparently raised more. Finally, on aver-
age, banks did not shrink, and in fact grew over
this period in every size and capital class. These
patterns confirm our primary emphasis on the
portfolio effects of the new capital requirements.
• 7 FDICIA directs bank regulators to use the risk-based capita) re-
quirements in making supervisory decisions/The Act established five
categories based primarily on the bank's capital position. To be consid-
ered well capitalized, a bank would have to exceed the minimum capital
requirements by a substantial margin. We caution the knowledgeable
reader that the capital classes we use are not FDICIA prompt-corrective-
action zones.B 0 X 1
WhyANOVA?
Though commonly used in many areas of statistics, analysis of
variance (ANOVA) is less popular among economists, who gen-
erally prefer regression analysis. For evaluating bank portfolio
shifts, however, ANOVA has several advantages.
First, it does not require assumptions about the nature of
the functional form of the statistical relation: In particular, it
does not impose a linear relation between capital and portfo-
lio shifts. A difference in the response of well-capitalized and
undercapitalized banks assumes a nonlinear response by defi-
nition. The different degrees of capital constraint (for exam-
ple, deeply undercapitalized, barely capitalized) coupled with
our ignorance about the correct form of the relation (linear,
logarithmic, quadratic) make the ANOVA specification particu-
larly attractive.
ANOVA might also be called "comparison of means." It sta-
tistically estimates the effects due to various factors (here,
they are size and capital class) and then allows comparison
of those effects—analyzing how and why the cells of table 6
differ from each other.
ANOVA has a further advantage in that it facilitates the esti-
mation and interpretation of interaction effects. Our analysis con-
siders two main effects, size and capital. Accounting for each
one separately may not provide the whole story: The main ef-
fects may not be additive, and there may be interaction effects.
For example, undercapitalized large banks may receive more
scrutiny from the regulators or find it easier to invest in certain
markets, and so may adjust their portfolios differently.
Banks had another reason to adjust portfolio
shares. The new requirements changed the re-
turns on different types of investments. Relative
to business and commercial real estate loans,
government securities became more profitable
because they required less capital backing. A
simple calculation shows that the difference
can be substantial.
The standard way to approach these issues
is with a version of the Miller (1977) debt
model as extended to banks by Orgler and
Taggart (1983). Banks have two sources of
funds: deposits and equity. Deposits have a
tax advantage in that banks may deduct inter-
est paid as a business expense, but cannot de-
duct dividends paid on equity. Deposits have
an additional cost of reserve requirements, but
in general banks would prefer to raise funds
using debt. Banks cannot fund themselves ex-
clusively with deposits, however, because they
face a constraint on their funding, namely a
capital requirement that the ratio of debt (for
example, deposits) to equity not exceed a limit
C,. If we denote the return on deposits as rd
and the return on equity as re, the marginal
cost of raising funds, r, is given by
(3) r —
re/{\ - Q
where t is the corporate tax rate and p is the
reserve requirement. The bank lends until the
return on the loan equals the cost of funds
needed to fund the loan.
8
The capital requirements impose a different £
on different assets, and thus induce a different
rate of return. As an example, consider a return
on equity re of 10 percent, a return on deposits
rd of 4 percent, a corporate tax rate t of 28 per-
cent, and required reserves p of 12 percent. A
U.S. Treasury bond has a C, of 24 (a zero risk
weighting and the 4 percent leverage require-
ment that becomes a debt-to-equity ratio of
0.96/0.04), while a C&I loan has a C, of 11.5 (a
100 percent risk weighting). In this case, the cost
of raising funds internally (r7) to buy a Treasury
bond is 4.9 percent, while the cost of raising
funds internally to make a loan is 5.4 percent.
The relative cost of loans has increased, making




The relationship between portfolio changes and
the risk-adjusted capital ratio prior to the intro-
duction of risk-based capital requirements is ex-
amined with an analysis of variance (ANOVA,
detailed in box 1). We investigate the relation-
ship for the asset categories outlined in table 4.
• 8 A little more intuition on the exact form of equation (3) can be
gained as follows. Assume that the bank wishes to raise one dollar as
cheaply as possible. The bank would like to use debt, for which it pays rd,
but it faces a capital constraint, so it can raise only a fraction of the funds us-
ing debt. It also must raise equity, and must pay more than re because of
corporate income tax. This explains the first term in the numerator. Because
the bank raises money from two different sources, the actual cost is a
weighted average of the cost of funds from those sources, and a little algebra
shows that the 1/1 +1; and C, /1 + £ terms provide the proportion of equity
and debt to total assets. Finally, some of the debt must be invested in re-
quired reserves, so to invest one full dollar, the bank must raise slightly
more than that, which accounts for the p term in the denominator.
• 9 The general situation is more complicated, of course. For exam-
ple, some banks can meet their capital requirement by increasing their
Tier 2 capital. This includes subordinated debt, which despite being
more expensive than deposits avoids the corporate tax penalty of equity.TABLE 4

































Analysis of Variance Results-
Probability that Observed Effect










































































The ANOVA was performed for the change in
the ratio to total assets for each category for two
time periods. The first period begins in June
1988, just before the risk-based capital require-
ments were announced, and the second one
starts in March 1990, the first available data after
the requirements were phased in. This process
shows whether the changes in the asset ratios dif-
fer significantly across size or capital classes.
The ANOVA F-tests for the effects of size
and capital class are summarized in table 5,
which presents the probabilities at which the
null hypothesis of no significant effect can be
rejected. That is, it gives the probability that all
effects of the given type are zero. The first col-
umn provides the overall test on all the effects
and interactions. The next two columns are
tests that depend on the ordering of the vari-
ables. The second column tests for the signifi-
cance of the size effects alone. This test is
based on the sum of squares, putting the size
effect in the estimation first. The third column
is a stringent test for the significance of the
capital class effects. It is based on the sum of
squares when the capital class is added last; it
tests the significance of the additional effect of
this variable, having already controlled for the
size and interaction effects.
1
0
In most instances, there are significant differ-
ences in asset changes among banks of various
size classes. This reflects a wide divergence in
portfolio allocations between large and small
banks. More important, the differences across
capital classes are significant even at the 5 per-
cent level for only a handful of asset categories.
For the asset changes between 1988 and
1992, there are substantial differences across
risk-adjusted capital ratio classes for only cash
assets and C&I loans. The changes in Treasury-
to-total-asset ratios do not vary much across
capital ratio classes (p = 0.3661). However,
when we examine changes from the introduc-
tion (rather than the announcement) of the
risk-based capital requirements, 1990 to 1992,
additional significant changes arise. For this
period, the changes in the Treasury-to-asset ra-
tios vary widely by capital ratio class (p= 0.0176).
In addition, there are substantial differences at
the 5 percent level for cash assets, C&I loans,
mortgages, and other loans.
The ANOVA results indicate a strong rela-
tionship between the initial capital ratio and
I 10 For a theoretical background, see Searle (1971); for a discus-
sion of the tests, see the SAS/STAT User's Guide (1990), chapters 9 and
24. The SAS system refers to the last two columns in table 5 as type I































































































































































SOURCES: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Quarterly Re-
ports on Income and Condition; and authors' calculations.
bank portfolio changes. In particular, the
changes emerge more clearly when the phase-
in of the new regulations began rather than at
the time they were announced. Two reasons
account for this delay: First, risk-based capital
requirements represented a radical change in
U.S. banking regulation, so a period of learn-
ing about their consequences is not surprising.
Second, if portfolio changes were made to im-
prove banks' capital position, they were not
necessary until the phase-in began. In addition,
government security portfolios can be changed
quickly and easily.
The ANOVA significance tests suggest that
there are important differences across asset ra-
tio categories, but do not imply any particular
direction in the relationship. For the four asset
categories with significant differences across
capital-ratio classes, we show the actual mean
changes in each capital class for the two-and-a-
half-year period after the introduction of risk-
based capital requirements in table 6.
The evidence is clear for both government
securities and C&I loans. The extent to which
the ratio of government bonds to assets in-
creased diminishes as the initial capital position
of the bank improves. In fact, in four of the six
size groups, the extremely well-capitalized
banks (capital ratios greater than 14 percent)
did not even boost their holdings of govern-
ment securities. The evidence for C&I loans is
equally compelling. Banks in all categories de-
creased their portfolio share in C&I loans. In
each size class, the fall in the C&I loan share
was larger for the poorly capitalized banks.
For banks with initial total-to-risk-adjusted
capital of less than 8 percent, the share of gov-
ernment securities in total assets increased on
average by 4 percentage points, and the share
of C&I loans in total assets decreased by 4 per-
centage points. Thus, there is a strong indica-
tion that poorly capitalized banks responded
to the new capital requirements by shifting
from C&I loans to government securities. Be-
cause the movement away from C&I loans is at
least partially due to the deteriorating quality
of loan portfolios, it is important to see if the
results are robust when we hold the quality of
the portfolio constant. The mortgage results
are more ambiguous, as expected. With a 50-
percent risk weight, they fall between commer-
cial loans and Treasury securities.
Tables 5 and 6 do not completely make the
case that a greater portfolio shift took place
among undercapitalized banks. The F-test sug-
gests that the means differ, and the means
themselves show greater portfolio shifts for un-TABLE 7
Tukey Multiple Comparison Tests
for Differences in means
A. Total Securities
Alpha = 0.05, Confidence = 0.05,
Degrees of Freedom = 10861,
Mean Square Error = 0.009487,
Critical Value of Studentized Range = 3-858.
B. Treasury Book
Alpha = 0.05, Confidence = 0.95,
Degrees of Freedom = 10861,
Mean Square Error = 0.005965,





















































































































































































































































a. Significant at the 0.05 percent level.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
dercapitalized banks, but neither approach in-
dicates which means differ from which other
means. To do so properly requires a multiple
comparison procedure, which introduces a
complication. The significance level (say 0.05)
of the standard t- and F-tests applies only to
that particular test, and not to a series of tests.
Thus, it would be inappropriate to use the
standard t-test to determine if the mean of capi-
tal class 1 and capital class 2 differed from the
mean of capital class 6. The standard statistic is
further inappropriate if the comparison is sug-
gested by the data, say comparing the highest
and the lowest means. For example, in compar-
ing the highest and lowest means, with six
classes the standard 5 percent test is in fact a
60 percent test (Neter and Wasserman [1974],
section 14.2). Table 7 corrects for these problems
by using the Tukey method for multiple compari-
son, which is based on the studentized range dis-
tribution (see Neter and Wasserman [1974],
section 14.3, and SAS/STAT User's Guide [1990],
volume 2, chapter 24). For example, the first
line of table 7 compares the mean change in
the proportion of total securities for capital
class 0 with the same mean for capital class 1.TABLE 7 (CONT.)
Tukey Multiple Comparison Tests
for Differences in Means
C. Total Loans
Alpha = 0.05, Confidence = 0.95,
Degrees of Freedom = 10861,
Mean Square Error = 0.008611,
Critical Value of Studentized Range = 3.858.
D. C&I Loans
Alpha = 0.05, Confidence = 0.95,
Degrees of Freedom = 10861,
Mean Square Error = 0.002579,




































































































































































































































































a. Significant at the 0.05 percent level.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
The difference between the means is positive,
but the confidence limits include 0, so we can-
not reject equality of the means.
The results in table 7 confirm the significance
of the portfolio change. The undercapitalized
banks shifted toward securities and away from
loans more than did the adequately capitalized
and well-capitalized banks.
But another possibility is yet unaccounted for.
Low-capitalized banks might have different
portfolio shifts even without a change in capi-
tal requirements. For example, suppose a bank
has low capital because of takedowns of loan
commitments that had been funded by pur-
chased money. That is, the bank ends up with
an unexpectedly high proportion of loans. Over
time, the bank might lower its loan level to re-
store the desired balance between loans and
securities. We wish to demonstrate that low-
capital banks do not normally increase their
securities holdings in the years following a
change in requirements.
To provide some evidence on this, we com-
pare the behavior of banks from 1988 to 1990
with their behavior from 1990 to 1992. Specifi-
cally, we compare the portfolio changes in low-TABLE
ANOVA Comparison of Portfolio
Shifts between Periods
most of the differences (even between nega-
tive and positive terms) are not statistically sig-
nificant, even at the 10 percent level.
Asset Components


































































NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
capital banks from 1988 to 1990 with portfolio
changes in all other banks from 1990 to 1992
and with low-capital (as of 1990) banks from
1990 to 1992. By using this method, we control
for portfolio shifts due to both macroeconomic
effects and low capitalization.
Table 8 reports these results. Capital require-
ments certainly appear to have had an impact.
Across each capital class, banks reduced their
C&I loans more from 1990 to 1992 than from
1988 to 1990. Low-capital banks even de-
creased their bond holdings in the earlier pe-
riod, but raised them in response to capital
requirements from 1990 to 1992. A large caveat
goes along with this work, however, in that
V. Regression
Analysis
We examine the influence of deterioration in
the quality of the loan portfolio on bank portfo-
lio allocation changes with a regression model
that is a simple extension of the ANOVA frame-
work. The regression equation includes dummy
variables for each of the size and capital classes
and a measure of the quality of the i
th bank's
loan portfolio:
A asset ratio, = a + E |$. size dummies, + I yk
capital dummies, + 8 loan quality,.
The charge-off ratio (as of March 1990) — the
ratio of net charge-offs to assets — is used to
measure loan quality.
A summary of the regression results for the
asset ratio changes between 1990 and 1992 for
each category is presented in table 9. The
charge-off rate has a significant influence on
each asset category. The largest effects of poor
loan quality are on the increase in Treasury se-
curities and on the decrease in real estate loans.
In both of these instances, a 0.5 percentage-
point increase in the charge-off ratio (which is
about equal to the increase in the aggregate ra-
tio over the 1980s, as shown in figure 4) re-
sults in an absolute change in the asset ratio of
about 0.01 percentage point. Significant differ-
ences between size classes and capital classes
appear in all but one category. Finally, the re-
gressions explain only a small proportion of
the interbank variation in asset ratios.
The bottom part of table 9 shows the esti-
mated coefficients for the capital dummies.
They represent differences from the omitted
category: banks with initial risk-adjusted capi-
tal ratios in excess of 14 percent. The relation-
ship between the initial capital position and
the extent to which the bank increased govern-
ment securities holdings and reduced loans is
still substantial. That is, even with the influ-
ence of the quality of the loan portfolio held
constant, poorly capitalized banks made large
portfolio adjustments away from both C&I and
real estate loans and toward holdings of gov-
ernment securities.TABLE 9
Summary of Regression Results
Coefficient








































































































NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
VI. Conclusion
The evidence presented here strongly suggests
that bank portfolio changes since 1990 are at
least in part a response to the introduction of risk-
based capital requirements. Qualitatively, at least,
the regulations succeeded. Comprehending the
changes improves our general understanding of
the effects of bank regulation. The particular ef-
fect of capital requirements on bank portfolios
merits special interest. The shift in bank portfo-
lios can affect their overall risk, and therefore the
risk of financial collapse and the liability of the
federal government acting as the lender of last re-
sort. On the other hand, the reduction in loans
may (under the "credit view") have macroeco-
nomic consequences and reflect on overall eco-
nomic growth, income, and unemployment.
1
1
• 11 The credit view argues that changes in bank lending—and in
credit more generally—have an important effect on the aggregate econ-
omy above and beyond any effect on the money supply.References
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